Cognitive neuropsychology
January 1, 2020
Richard Brown, Joseph Ledoux
26 citations
The Attention Schema Theory (AST) of consciousness attempts to unify Global Workspace Theory, Illusionism, and Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory. This response argues that AST misrepresents HOT by equating subjective experience with dualism and by presenting HOT as a form of strong illusionism, which it is not. HOT requires awareness of one's mental life through re-representation of lower-order states, but AST denies re-representing visual stimuli. An alternative unification is proposed: Global Workspace Theory and AST explain how lower-order states are assembled and maintained, while HOT accounts for subjective experience.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
July 6, 2026
Richard Brown
Higher-order theories of consciousness are empirical conjectures that can be tested and potentially falsified. The author examines what these theories imply about infant consciousness, focusing on Ned Block's argument that infants aged 6–11 months have conscious color experiences without possessing color concepts. The author contends that Block's argument does not disprove higher-order theories but instead raises empirical questions that could help distinguish between different versions of the theory or determine whether the approach is viable.
Consciousness as Representing One's Mind
July 1, 2025
Richard Brown
Phenomenal consciousness—the subjective, first-person experience of being—is the core phenomenon that any scientific theory of consciousness must explain. The author argues that the central task for the emerging field of cognitive neuroscience of consciousness is to evaluate and adjudicate among existing theories of human phenomenal consciousness, rather than focusing on secondary puzzles or methodological issues. This argument sets a clear explanatory target for future research in consciousness science.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
September 1, 2019
Richard Brown, H. Lau, Joseph E LeDoux
The higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness is often misunderstood. This theoretical paper clarifies HOT's position, distinguishing it from global workspace theory and early sensory models. Critics have accused HOT of overintellectualizing consciousness, but the authors argue that the cognitive requirements for higher-order states are considerably less than often presumed, positioning HOT as intermediate between other views. Most HOT proponents do not equate consciousness with metacognition or confidence. Compared to other theories, HOT can better account for complex everyday experiences like emotions and episodic memories, making it useful for conceptualizing pathological mental states.