Infant color-consciousness from the higher-order perspective

Higher-order theories of consciousness are empirical conjectures that can be tested and potentially falsified. The author examines what these theories imply about infant consciousness, focusing on Ned Block's argument that infants aged 6–11 months have conscious color experiences without possessing color concepts. The author contends that Block's argument does not disprove higher-order theories but instead raises empirical questions that could help distinguish between different versions of the theory or determine whether the approach is viable.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Higher-order theories of consciousness have gained attention as of late. This is because we are in a position where we can begin to see how we would empirically falsify these kinds of theories. I view these kinds of theories as interesting empirical conjectures about the nature of phenomenal consciousness. If they are false, it will be for empirical reasons. There has been a long debate about what these kinds of theories says about infant consciousness. Theories of consciousness should, at least in principle, be able to account for this possibility. Thus, I want to explore what the higher-order theories currently on offer have to say about this issue. For the most part I will gloss over the details of the theories, unless the details matter for the point at hand (in some cases they do). We will start by looking at what higher-order theories have said in the literature about infant consciousness up to this point. Then I will then present Ned Block’s recent (Block 2023) argument that infants in the 6-11 month range have conscious color experience but do not typically have color concepts. As we will see, this argument does not falsify higher-order theories. I will argue that it suggests future empirical questions that may help us to decide between versions of the higher-order theory or whether we should pursue that approach at all.