Growing public discussion about consciousness in animals, fetuses, organoids, and artificial intelligence has prompted strong claims. However, most of these claims rely on 'markers' of consciousness that measure general information processing capacity rather than subjective experience itself. Consequently, the usefulness of such markers for settling theoretical debates about consciousness may be limited.
The higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness is often misunderstood. This theoretical paper clarifies HOT's position, distinguishing it from global workspace theory and early sensory models. Critics have accused HOT of overintellectualizing consciousness, but the authors argue that the cognitive requirements for higher-order states are considerably less than often presumed, positioning HOT as intermediate between other views. Most HOT proponents do not equate consciousness with metacognition or confidence. Compared to other theories, HOT can better account for complex everyday experiences like emotions and episodic memories, making it useful for conceptualizing pathological mental states.