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Trends in Cognitive Sciences

ISSN 1364-6613

15 papers in the library · 4,006 citations · publishing 2003-2025

Papers

Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self

Trends in Cognitive Sciences October 12, 2013 Anil K. Seth 1,812 citations

The brain functions as a prediction machine, a view recently revived by Bayesian brain and predictive coding theories. While this perspective has mainly been applied to external senses like vision and action, this work extends it to interoception—the perception of internal body states. The 'interoceptive inference' model proposes that subjective feelings and emotions arise from the brain's active inference about the causes of internal bodily signals. This approach generalizes appraisal theories, which hold that emotions result from cognitive evaluations of physiological changes. It also provides new insights into the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying body ownership and conscious selfhood, both in health and neuropsychiatric conditions.

Two neural correlates of consciousness

Trends in Cognitive Sciences January 13, 2005 Ned Block 715 citations

The search for a single neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) may be misguided. Evidence increasingly supports a framework with at least two distinct NCCs: a phenomenal NCC and an access NCC. These can be distinguished using experimental methods such as signal-detection theory. Recent cognitive neuroscience findings provide empirical support for two separate NCCs rather than one.

No-Report Paradigms: Extracting the True Neural Correlates of Consciousness

Trends in Cognitive Sciences November 13, 2015 Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Melanie Wilke, Stefan Frässle et al. 567 citations

The search for the neural basis of consciousness has been biased by the requirement that subjects report their experiences. Recent no-report paradigms aim to study conscious experience without any report, dissociating neural activity that gives rise to consciousness from activity that enables reporting. The advantages and disadvantages of both report-based and no-report approaches are discussed, and the authors ask how combining these methods can bring us closer to understanding the true neural basis of consciousness.

Are There Levels of Consciousness?

Trends in Cognitive Sciences April 22, 2016 Tim Bayne, Jakob Hohwy, Adrian M. Owen 443 citations

The concept of a level of consciousness is central to the science of consciousness, used to describe global states in post-comatose disorders, epileptic absence seizures, anesthesia, and sleep. However, what a level of consciousness actually means remains unclear. This paper argues that the levels-based framework for understanding global states of consciousness is untenable and instead proposes a multidimensional account of global states.

A neurophenomenological approach to non-ordinary states of consciousness: hypnosis, meditation, and psychedelics

Trends in Cognitive Sciences December 22, 2022 Christopher Timmermann, Prisca R. Bauer, Olivia Gosseries et al. 145 citations

A neurophenomenological framework is proposed for studying non-ordinary states of consciousness (NSCs) such as hypnosis, meditation, and psychedelics. NSCs involve shifts in what appears to the experiencer or how it appears, enabling investigation of the plastic and dynamic nature of experience across mind, brain, body, and context. The approach highlights NSCs as catalysts of transformation in clinical practice by refining understanding of relationships between subjective experience and neural dynamics. Ethical implications for standard conceptions of health and pathology are outlined, along with the crucial role of experience-based know-how in NSC research and application.

The strength of weak integrated information theory

Trends in Cognitive Sciences June 1, 2022 Pedro A. M. Mediano, Fernando E. Rosas, Daniel Bor et al. 109 citations

The integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) proposes a universal mathematical formula derived from fundamental properties of conscious experience to describe the quality of consciousness. The theory is ambitious in that it aims to derive a mathematical measure of integrated information from consciousness itself, using properties of conscious experience to characterize the quality of consciousness. The text repeatedly states that IIT is a theory of consciousness that proposes a mathematical formula derived from fundamental properties of conscious experience to describe the quality of consciousness, but it does not provide specific findings, numbers, or empirical results.

Near-Death Experience as a Probe to Explore (Disconnected) Consciousness

Trends in Cognitive Sciences January 22, 2020 Charlotte Martial, Héléna Cassol, Steven Laureys et al. 90 citations

Near-death experiences (NDEs) occur during comatose states, challenging the common view that consciousness disappears when the brain shuts down. A new framework distinguishing awareness, wakefulness, and connectedness is needed to understand the phenomenon. Classical NDEs represent internal awareness experienced in unresponsive conditions, constituting an episode of disconnected consciousness. This proposal points toward new directions for NDE research and consciousness science more broadly.

Out-of-body experiences: from Penfield to present

Trends in Cognitive Sciences March 1, 2003 Frank Tong 73 citations

Electrical stimulation of the angular gyrus can trigger out-of-body experiences, as reported in a patient studied by Blanke and colleagues in 2002. This finding aligns with earlier observations by Wilder Penfield. Such cases offer insights into the neural basis of conscious experience.

The emotional architecture of the psychedelic brain

Trends in Cognitive Sciences August 18, 2025 Flora Moujaes, Nathalie M. Rieser, L. Belinger et al. 5 citations

Serotonergic psychedelics are being investigated as treatments for psychiatric conditions, with promising results in mood disorders suggesting their effects on emotional processing may be central to therapeutic potential. However, mechanistic and clinical studies reveal a complex picture of how psychedelics impact emotions and mood. This review covers recent findings on psychedelics' effects on emotion, emotional empathy, and mood, discussing their influence on long-term emotion management strategies, the role of challenging experiences, and neuroplastic changes. The authors argue that more precise characterization of emotional states and attention to temporal dynamics of psychedelic-induced effects are critical for clarifying mechanisms and optimizing therapeutic impact.

Consciousness in the cradle: on the emergence of infant experience

Trends in Cognitive Sciences October 1, 2023 Tim Bayne, Joel Frohlich, R. Cusack et al.

Evidence from studies of functional network connectivity, attention, multimodal integration, and cortical responses to global oddballs suggests that consciousness is likely present in early infancy and may even occur before birth. Recent research is beginning to provide clues about both the content and structure of infant consciousness.

Perceptual awareness negativity: a physiological correlate of sensory consciousness.

Trends in Cognitive Sciences June 22, 2021 C. Dembski, Christof Koch, Michael A. Pitts

The P3b brain wave is not a reliable marker of conscious perception, as many experiments have failed to observe it during conscious experience. In contrast, the visual and auditory awareness negativity (VAN and AAN) have not been dissociated from consciousness, and a similar signal correlates with tactile consciousness. These awareness negativities are likely generated in sensory cortices and can be maximal contralateral to the stimulus, suggesting a generalized perceptual awareness negativity (PAN) that marks the onset of sensory consciousness.

Understanding the Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness.

Trends in Cognitive Sciences September 1, 2019 Richard Brown, H. Lau, Joseph E LeDoux

The higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness is often misunderstood. This theoretical paper clarifies HOT's position, distinguishing it from global workspace theory and early sensory models. Critics have accused HOT of overintellectualizing consciousness, but the authors argue that the cognitive requirements for higher-order states are considerably less than often presumed, positioning HOT as intermediate between other views. Most HOT proponents do not equate consciousness with metacognition or confidence. Compared to other theories, HOT can better account for complex everyday experiences like emotions and episodic memories, making it useful for conceptualizing pathological mental states.

Coupling Inner and Outer Body for Self-Consciousness.

Trends in Cognitive Sciences May 1, 2019 Hyeong-Dong Park, O. Blanke

Recent research on self-consciousness has separately examined bodily signals from outside the body (exteroception) and from internal organs (interoception), with little integration between these approaches. This review synthesizes evidence on interoceptive bodily processing and its combination with exteroceptive signals for self-consciousness. The authors propose an integrated neural system that reconciles these two perspectives and explains fundamental aspects of self-consciousness, including self-identification, self-location, and the experienced global unity and temporal continuity of the self.

One, not two, neural correlates of consciousness.

Trends in Cognitive Sciences June 1, 2005 B. Baars, Steven Laureys

The authors critique Ned Block's distinction between phenomenological consciousness (what we experience) and access consciousness (information accessible via conscious experiences). They argue that evidence from cognitive neuroscience does not support this division. For instance, visual cortex activity is necessary but not sufficient for conscious visual qualities; without parietal and prefrontal activation, no correlation with consciousness is found. Similarly, when frontoparietal regions are impaired, sensory consciousness is absent despite sensory cortex activation. The authors contend that unconscious brain mechanisms interact with visual cortex to enable visual qualities, and that positing a separate 'access consciousness' is unnecessary. They suggest that what is needed is simply consciously-mediated access to brain capacities, most of which are unconscious.