Higher-order memory schema and consciousness experience.
Cognitive neuropsychology January 1, 2020 DOI: 10.1080/02643294.2020.1729713 via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe Attention Schema Theory (AST) of consciousness attempts to unify Global Workspace Theory, Illusionism, and Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory. This response argues that AST misrepresents HOT by equating subjective experience with dualism and by presenting HOT as a form of strong illusionism, which it is not. HOT requires awareness of one's mental life through re-representation of lower-order states, but AST denies re-representing visual stimuli. An alternative unification is proposed: Global Workspace Theory and AST explain how lower-order states are assembled and maintained, while HOT accounts for subjective experience.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Global workspace Higher-order thought Memory schema |
| Citations | 26 |
| Key finding | Attention Schema Theory misrepresents Higher-Order Thought theory by equating subjective experience with dualism and denying re-representation, whereas an alternative unification assigns HOT the role of explaining subjective experience. |
Abstract
In the interesting and thought-provoking article Grazziano and colleagues argue for their Attention Schema Theory (AST) of consciousness. They present AST as a unification of Global Workspace Theory (GWT), Illusionism, and the Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory. We argue it is a mistake to equate 'subjective experience,' ad related terms, with dualism. They simply denote experience. Also, as presented, AST does not accurately capture the essence of HOT for two reasons. HOT is presented as a version of strong illusionism, which it isn't, and HOT requires that one be aware of one's mental life, and postulates that his consists in a re-representation of what is occurring at at the lower-order levels. However, the authors deny that AST involves re-representing visual stimuli. We close by proposing an alternative unification: GWT and AST provide crucial accounts of how lower-order states are assembled and maintained, but higher-order theory provides the account of subjective experience.