Modelling aspects of consciousness: A topological perspective.
Journal of theoretical biology August 21, 2021 DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2021.110713 via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractSubjective awareness may arise because the brain builds a simplified, incomplete model of its own attention—an 'attention schema.' This incompleteness prevents us from fully understanding how consciousness emerges, which relates to the 'hard problem' of consciousness. Using a mathematical model grounded in classical topology, the paper demonstrates that a complete representation of attention is impossible for any system, human or machine, that monitors its own attention. The argument shows that attention streams cannot be faithfully represented internally, supporting the core claim of Attention Schema Theory: the brain's self-model of attention is necessarily incomplete.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Attention schema theory Consciousness Dimensionality Neuroscience Topology |
| Key finding | A complete representation of attention is impossible, supporting the claim that the brain's attention schema is necessarily incomplete. |
Abstract
Attention Schema Theory (AST) is a recent proposal to provide a scientific explanation for the basis of subjective awareness. In AST, the brain constructs a representation of attention taking place in its own (and others') mind ('the attention schema'). Moreover, this representation is incomplete for efficiency reasons. This inherent incompleteness of the attention schema results in the inability of humans to understand how their own subjective awareness arises (related to the so-called 'hard problem' of consciousness). Given this theory, the present paper asks whether a mind (either human or machine-based) that incorporates attention, and that contains a representation of its own attention, can ever have a complete representation. Using a simple yet general model and a mathematical argument based on classical topology, we show that a complete representation of attention is not possible, since it cannot faithfully represent streams of attention. In this way, the study supports one of the core aspects of AST, that the brain's representation of its own attention is necessarily incomplete.