The philosophy of phenomenal consciousness

Consciousness research advances, but the 'phenomenal' aspect—the first-person, subjective feel of experience—remains hard to explain. This aspect appears private and knowable in a special way, clashing with science's objective, third-person methods. The introduction surveys phenomenal consciousness, philosophical arguments about its nature, and whether an explanation for its properties should be expected.

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Abstract

The scientific study of consciousness is constantly making new discoveries, but one particular aspect of consciousness remains problematic to explain. This is the fact that conscious experiences present themselves to us in a first-person way: there is something it feels like to be the subject of a conscious experience. This ‘phenomenal’ aspect of consciousness seems to be subjective, private, and knowable in a special way, making it difficult to reconcile with the scientific focus on objective, third-person data. This introduction provides an overview of phenomenal consciousness, explores philosophical arguments about its nature, and considers whether or not we should expect to find an explanation for the properties of phenomenal consciousness.