Phenomenal Consciousness

Phenomenal consciousness—the subjective feel of experience—can be fully explained in naturalistic, scientifically acceptable terms. Peter Carruthers argues against the view that consciousness is inherently mysterious, developing a novel account based on higher-order thought. Drawing on interdisciplinary resources, he shows that this approach explains away extravagant claims about consciousness while substantively accounting for the subjectivity of experience. The book surveys a wide range of extant theories and is aimed at readers in philosophy and psychology.

Study at a glance

Abstract

How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious. Peter Carruthers argues, on the contrary, that the subjective feel of our experience is fully explicable in naturalistic (scientifically acceptable) terms. Drawing on a variety of interdisciplinary resources, he develops and defends a novel account in terms of higher-order thought. He shows that this can explain away some of the more extravagant claims made about phenomenal consciousness, while substantively explaining the key subjectivity of our experience. Written with characteristic clarity and directness, and surveying a wide range of extant theories, this book is essential reading for all those within philosophy and psychology interested in the problem of consciousness.