Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge

This book examines the nature of consciousness and its relationship to brain processes, focusing on phenomenal consciousness—what it is like to have an experience. A central controversy is whether physicalism (the view that the mind is physical) can account for consciousness. The discussion centers on Frank Jackson's thought experiment of Mary, a scientist who knows all physical facts about color vision while confined to a black-and-white room. Intuitively, Mary learns something new when she first sees color, which seems to challenge physicalism. The book explores whether this challenge can be defused by appealing to how phenomenal concepts and knowledge work, or whether the problem persists at the level of those concepts themselves.

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Abstract

Abstract What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related to brain processes? This book discusses these topics. All chapters focus on consciousness in the “phenomenal” sense: looking at what it's like to have an experience. Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for physicalism, the view that the mind is physical. This controversy has gained focus over the last few decades, and phenomenal knowledge and phenomenal concepts — knowledge of consciousness and the associated concepts — have come to play increasingly prominent roles in this debate. Consider Frank Jackson's famous case of Mary, the super-scientist who learns all the physical information while confined in a black-and-white room. According to Jackson, if physicalism is true, then Mary's physical knowledge should allow her to deduce what it's like to see in color. Yet it seems intuitively clear that she learns something when she leaves the room. But then how can consciousness be physical? Arguably, whether this sort of reasoning is sound depends on how phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge are construed. For example, some argue that the Mary case reveals something about phenomenal concepts but has no implications for the nature of consciousness itself. Are responses along these lines adequate? Or does the problem arise again at the level of phenomenal concepts?