A Boundary Perspective on Life: Conceptual Implications for Biological Organization and Conscious Experience

The decisive discontinuity in nature was not the separate emergence of life and then consciousness, but the invention of the boundary—a membrane separating interior from exterior. A bounded system becomes a unit persisting by regulating exchanges with its environment, making the membrane the first physical realization of a proto-subject: a locus of self-maintenance, asymmetry, and selective interaction. Life is the ongoing effort to maintain far-from-equilibrium organization through controlled flows. Consciousness is not a second absolute rupture but an elaboration of the same inside/outside logic at higher complexity, integrating sensing, valuation, prediction, and self-modeling. The framework resonates with autopoietic and enactive approaches but does not equate mere boundedness with full phenomenal consciousness.

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Abstract

This paper develops the thesis that the decisive discontinuity in nature was not first the emergence of life and then, separately, the emergence of consciousness, but rather the invention of the boundary: the appearance of a membrane that separated an interior from an exterior. A bounded system is no longer a mere portion of matter among other portions of matter. It becomes a unit whose persistence depends on regulating exchanges with an environment. In this sense, the membrane is the first physical realization of a proto-subject: a locus of self-maintenance, asymmetry, and selective interaction. From this starting point, life can be understood as the ongoing effort to maintain a far-from-equilibrium organization through controlled flows of matter and energy. Consciousness, on this view, is not a second absolute rupture but an elaboration of the same inside/outside logic at higher levels of complexity, where sensing, valuation, prediction, and self-modeling become increasingly integrated. This framework resonates with autopoietic and enactive approaches, while remaining cautious not to equate mere boundedness with full phenomenal consciousness. The paper situates this view within the current state of the art in consciousness research, addressing neuroscientific theories and computational models; assesses what the boundary-centered account implies for artificial intelligence; and proposes experimental directions with the aim of empirically verifying the thesis