Blind Spots and Overlooked Structures in Consciousness Research — Repositioning IIT, Global Workspace Theory, Predictive Processing, the Free Energy Principle, Embodied Cognition, Higher-Order Theory, and Recurrent Processing Theory through the Convergence-Structure Hypothesis —
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) June 22, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20791098 via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractMany mechanisms of consciousness have been identified, but how they close into a single subjective experience remains unclear. The convergence-point hypothesis proposes that the key is not integration of complexity but reduction: how multiple behavioral possibilities are narrowed into one irreversible event belonging to a single body. Ten natural premises—including autonomous action, a single body, arrow of time, embodiment-constrained processing, information discard, Landauer-type irreversibility, and viability-constrained elimination—when causally closed, form a convergence point. The brain is essential but not the whole structure; the relevant unit is the closed body-bound system. Existing theories are repositioned as partial mechanisms. The hypothesis predicts that conscious nervous systems should exhibit convergence-forming architectures that generate, compete, narrow, and select candidates into one embodied history.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Embodied cognition Event particle physics Energy signal processing Convergence economics |
| Key finding | The convergence point—where multiple possibilities are reduced to one irreversible event within a single body—is the overlooked structure that closes mechanisms of consciousness into a unified subject. |
Abstract
Current consciousness research has clarified many important mechanisms: information integration, global workspace, predictive processing, the free energy principle, embodiment, higher-order representation, and recurrent processing. Yet one central point remains insufficiently specified: where these mechanisms close into a single subject. Existing theories have often asked how complexity is integrated. The convergence-point hypothesis asks a sharper question: how complexity is reduced, how non-selected possibilities are discarded, and how one irreversible event is fixed within the history of a single body. This paper formulates that overlooked structure as the convergence point. The decisive issue is not the listing of individual mechanisms, but their causal connection. Which elements of nature must be connected for multiple possibilities to converge into one event? And at what point does information cease to remain a mere possibility and undergo a transition into an event belonging to one body? The answer proposed in this paper consists of ten natural premises: Autonomous Action, Single Body, Arrow of Time, Embodiment-Constrained Processing, Multiple Behavioral Candidates, Contrast Formation, Information Discard, Landauer-Type Irreversibility, Single History, and Viability-Constrained Elimination. These are not merely conceptual terms. When they are causally closed, a convergence point appears. From this perspective, the central task of consciousness research is not simply to locate consciousness somewhere inside the brain. It is to identify the structure in which multiple possibilities cease to remain open and become one embodied event. One major blind spot in consciousness research may be an excessive fixation on the brain alone. The brain is indispensable, but it is not the whole structure in which subjectivity is formed. From the viewpoint of engineering-like causal closure, neural implementation is one process by which the requirements of convergence are efficiently satisfied. The relevant unit is not the isolated brain, but the closed body-bound system in which neural activity, bodily constraint, action candidates, environmental coupling, temporal irreversibility, information discard, and viability constraints form one history. This view does not reject existing theories of consciousness. Rather, it repositions them as partial mechanisms of convergence-point formation. Integration, attention, prediction, embodiment, memory, self-maintenance, recurrent processing, global availability, and higher-order representation each explain important aspects of subjectivity. However, unless the point at which these mechanisms close into one body, one present, and one irreversible history is specified, the center of subjectivity remains unidentified. The hypothesis also clarifies boundary cases. A system does not possess the structural skeleton of subjectivity merely by processing information, rewriting states, or producing complex outputs. It must close the causal chain of multiple candidate generation, contrast, elimination under bodily and viability constraints, information discard, irreversibility, and single-history formation within a single operational body. Finally, the hypothesis yields an empirical prediction. Conscious or potentially conscious nervous systems should exhibit convergence-forming architectures: structures that generate multiple candidates, make them compete, narrow them through inhibition and selection, and update the organism into one embodied history. Across species, what should be conserved is not necessarily a specific brain region or anatomical form, but the causal organization by which multiple embodied possibilities are narrowed into one irreversible event.