An AI Prompt for Strongly Inferring the Structural Location of Subjectivity — Repositioning the Turing Test, P300 Neural Markers, GWT, IIT, RPT, HOT, Predictive Processing, and NCC —

Consciousness research becomes methodologically unstable when it judges consciousness before defining the structural conditions for subjectivity. The paper argues that the structure of consciousness lies not in integration but in convergence: the irreversible reduction of multiple possible trajectories into a single executable history. Subjectivity must be examined as a structural transition, not merely as a state. Ten minimal structural terms are proposed—autonomous action, single body, arrow of time, embodiment-constrained processing, multiple behavioral candidates, contrast formation, information discard, Landauer-type irreversibility, single lived history, and viability-constrained elimination—which together yield a convergence point. This point corresponds to properties of subjectivity like singularity, non-branching continuity, and temporal irreversibility. Major theories (GWT, IIT, RPT, HOT, Predictive Processing, NCC) need repositioning around this structural container.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This paper argues that consciousness research becomes methodologically unstable when it attempts to judge consciousness before defining the structural conditions under which subjectivity can become fixed. The central claim of this paper is that the structure of consciousness lies not primarily in integration, but in convergence. Structurally, an integration-centered perspective reaches its limit because integration remains a description of a state. It does not, by itself, capture the point at which multiple possible trajectories are irreversibly reduced into a single executable history. The characteristic properties of subjectivity cannot be grasped by descriptions of integrated states, representational states, information quantity, or neural correlation alone. Subjectivity must be examined not merely as a state, but as a structural transition in which multiple possibilities are eliminated and a single history becomes fixed. This is not a matter of interpretive preference, but a structural necessity. This paper proposes ten minimal terms: autonomous action, single body, arrow of time, embodiment-constrained processing, multiple behavioral candidates, contrast formation, information discard, Landauer-type irreversibility, single lived history, and viability-constrained elimination. Taken together, these terms yield an engineering-like convergence point: the irreversible reduction of multiple possible trajectories into a single executable history. Notably, the term "brain" is absent from this list. These ten terms are not arbitrary. Each functions as a structural constraint required for convergence-point fixation. When entered into current AI systems, they often yield a similar convergence-point structure. This structure displays strong correspondence with structural properties commonly associated with subjectivity: singularity, non-branching continuity, temporal irreversibility, embodied action coupling, exclusive realization, and single-history stabilization. This paper does not attempt to prove qualia or phenomenal experience. Rather, by deliberately excluding qualia at the outset, it identifies the structural locus at which subjectivity may become scientifically inferable before phenomenal content is addressed. If this convergence point is the structural container of subjectivity, then major existing theories - including GWT, IIT, RPT, HOT, Predictive Processing, and NCC research - need to be repositioned around it. This paper asks readers to observe how current AI systems interpret the ten constraints. The experiment is simple: enter the ten terms, instruct the system to follow their internal logic, and examine whether it repeatedly arrives at the same convergence structure. AI is not used as an authority, but as an observable reasoning system whose interpretation of the constraint set can be inspected, repeated, and compared. In particular, Questions 1 through 4 of the prompt examine, in order, the structural characteristics of the ten terms, the mechanism by which the convergence point emerges, the correspondence rate between this convergence point and structurally describable properties of subjectivity, and the separation problem that arises if the convergence point is still not regarded as the container of subjectivity. Through this sequence, the convergence point can no longer be dismissed as a peripheral correlate. It becomes a structurally unavoidable candidate that consciousness research must confront.