The mind-body problem in the philosophy of mind and cognitive neuroscience: a physicalist naturalist solution.
Neurological sciences : official journal of the Italian Neurological Society and of the Italian Society of Clinical Neurophysiology September 1, 2018 DOI: 10.1007/s10072-018-3455-6 via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA voluntary action triggered by a visual perception reveals three fundamental characteristics of that perception: it is conscious, self-conscious, and has content. These are implemented by three distinct higher-order properties of brain dynamics. This leads to a physicalist naturalist solution to the mind-body problem: primary phenomenal consciousness is not a non-physical substance or property but the format the brain gives to part of its dynamics to achieve fine-tuning with the environment during bodily action.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Cognitive neuroscience Consciousness Epistemology Intentionality Mind-body problem |
| Citations | 7 |
| Key finding | Primary phenomenal consciousness is the format the brain gives to part of its dynamics to fine-tune with the environment during action. |
Abstract
Using an analysis of a voluntary action caused by a visual perception, I suggest that the three fundamental characteristics of this perception (being conscious, self-conscious, and provided with a content) are neurologically implemented by three distinct higher order properties of brain dynamics. This hypothesis allows me to sketch out a physicalist naturalist solution to the mind-body problem. According to this solution, primary phenomenal consciousness is neither a non-physical substance, nor a non-physical property but simply the "format" that the brain gives to a part of its dynamics in order to obtain a fine tuning with its environment when the body acts on it.