Unitary and dual models of phenomenal consciousness.

Most consciousness theorists agree that a mental state cannot have a phenomenal character (what it feels like) without being conscious. This paper challenges that consensus by distinguishing two models. The unitary model treats the production of a phenomenal quality and its becoming conscious as a single process. The dual model, which the authors advocate, separates the formation of the phenomenal quality from the process that makes it conscious. They present conceptual, methodological, neuropsychological, and neural arguments that together support the dual model and the idea of unconscious mental qualities. The dual view is proposed as a hypothesis worth further investigation.

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Abstract

There is almost unanimous consensus among the theorists of consciousness that the phenomenal character of a mental state cannot exist without consciousness. We argue for a reappraisal of this consensus. We distinguish two models of phenomenal consciousness: unitary and dual. Unitary model takes the production of a phenomenal quality and it's becoming conscious to be one and the same thing. The dual model, which we advocate in this paper, distinguishes the process in which the phenomenal quality is formed from the process that makes this quality conscious. We put forward a conceptual, methodological, neuropsychological and neural argument for the dual model. These arguments are independent but provide mutual support to each other. Together, they strongly support the dual model of phenomenal consciousness and the concomitant idea of unconscious mental qualities. The dual view is thus, we submit, a hypothesis worthy of further probing and development.