How to Mitigate the Hard Problem by Adopting the Dual Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.

The hard problem of consciousness—explaining why and how physical processes give rise to subjective experience—may be partly an artifact of assuming that consciousness and phenomenality (the quality of subjective experience) are inseparable. Rejecting this assumption and adopting a non-unitary view, in which consciousness and phenomenality can come apart, does not eliminate the hard problem but reframes it, making the explanatory task more tractable and reducing the apparent mystery. The paper sketches additional advantages of this non-unitary account.

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Abstract

In this paper, we propose the following hypothesis: the hard problem of consciousness is in part an artifact of what we call the unitary approach to phenomenal consciousness. The defining mark of the unitary approach is that it views consciousness and phenomenality as inseparable. Giving up this conceptual commitment redefines, in a productive way, the explanatory tasks of the theory of consciousness. Adopting a non-unitary conception of experience does not make the hard problem of consciousness go away completely but it shifts the locus of where the explanation of experience gets difficult, and cuts down the mystery of consciousness to size. Other advantages of the non-unitary account of consciousness are sketched as well.