The Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness

Phenomenal consciousness—the subjective, qualitative feel of experience—poses a "hard problem" for physicalist theories that try to explain the mind in purely physical terms. After outlining the problem and reviewing common physicalist responses, the chapter develops a Buddhist-inspired resolution. The key insight is that applying theory of mind to oneself involves inner speech, which creates a mirroring of the subject's own representational system. Because a mirror image is an illusory appearance, the apparent subject-object dichotomy is itself an illusion. Qualia, the raw feels of experience, are thus artifacts of deploying a useful fiction rather than fundamental features of reality.

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Abstract

Abstract This chapter addresses the “hard problem” of phenomenal consciousness that confronts any form of physicalism. After describing the problem and discussing some common approaches that physicalists have offered in response, it attempts to develop a specifically Buddhist approach to its resolution. This turns on the key point that first-person application of theory of mind involves the development of inner speech, something that fosters a kind of mirroring of the subject’s representational system. Since a mirror image is an illusory appearance, this reveals the subject-object dichotomy to be a kind of illusion. Qualia are thereby shown to be artifacts of the deployment of a sort of useful fiction.