Phenomenal consciousness—the subjective, qualitative feel of experience—poses a "hard problem" for physicalist theories that try to explain the mind in purely physical terms. After outlining the problem and reviewing common physicalist responses, the chapter develops a Buddhist-inspired resolution. The key insight is that applying theory of mind to oneself involves inner speech, which creates a mirroring of the subject's own representational system. Because a mirror image is an illusory appearance, the apparent subject-object dichotomy is itself an illusion. Qualia, the raw feels of experience, are thus artifacts of deploying a useful fiction rather than fundamental features of reality.
The chapter initiates a dialogue between Indian Buddhist philosophy and contemporary theories of consciousness and cognitive development. It introduces key terms from current research and compares them with Buddhist concepts, addressing challenges in formulating a non-egological account of state consciousness. A solution is proposed using the System 1/System 2 distinction, identifying state consciousness with mental states posted to the global workspace. The "too-many-subjects" objection to physicalist theories of consciousness is considered and countered through the Buddhist two-truths doctrine.
A central claim of physicalist illusionism is that meta-cognition involves a person applying theory of mind to themselves after the fact, rather than having direct introspective access. This argument is supported by evidence from cognitive development and philosophy of consciousness. The chapter examines how children acquire theory of mind and debates whether there is an asymmetry between attributing mental states to oneself versus others. It also discusses how the transparency of perception relates to the kind of illusionism required by Buddhist physicalism, particularly regarding how meta-cognition is possible.
Classical Indian Buddhist schools treat consciousness as ultimately real, a claim that a physicalist Buddhism would have to reject. The text examines whether a non-egological account of consciousness can be formulated that respects the metaphysical constraints of the Buddhist philosophical project. A central problem is that such an account fails the loneliness test required by the intrinsic-nature criterion for ultimate realities. Additionally, sorites paradoxes violate the requirement that ultimate realities be metaphysically determinate. The difficulty of explaining meta-cognition is also considered.