How rich is consciousness? The partial awareness hypothesis.

Current theories distinguish phenomenal consciousness (rich experience) from access consciousness (limited reportable content). The authors argue that evidence for phenomenal consciousness without access is weak, often confusing unconscious contents or illusory richness with genuine phenomenal experience. They propose a refined account where access operates across a hierarchy of representational levels, with partial awareness allowing independent access to lower and higher levels. This reframing of dissociable forms of consciousness into dissociable levels of access offers a more parsimonious explanation of existing evidence, and the illusion of rich phenomenology can be studied through testable cognitive mechanisms.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Current theories of consciousness posit a dissociation between 'phenomenal' consciousness (rich) and 'access' consciousness (limited). Here, we argue that the empirical evidence for phenomenal consciousness without access is equivocal, resulting either from a confusion between phenomenal and unconscious contents, or from an impression of phenomenally rich experiences arising from illusory contents. We propose a refined account of access that relies on a hierarchy of representational levels and on the notion of partial awareness, whereby lower and higher levels are accessed independently. Reframing of the issue of dissociable forms of consciousness into dissociable levels of access provides a more parsimonious account of the existing evidence. In addition, the rich phenomenology illusion can be studied and described in terms of testable cognitive mechanisms.