Downgraded phenomenology: how conscious overflow lost its richness.

Although moment-to-moment experience of the world feels vivid and rich, visual awareness is actually quite sparse, as shown by phenomena like change blindness and inattentional blindness. When failures of memory or comparison are ruled out, these phenomena provide strong evidence against the idea of rich visual awareness. To account for such massive failures, any theory of phenomenal consciousness must downgrade phenomenology to a point where it is functionless or does not reflect what we actually experience.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Our in-the-moment experience of the world can feel vivid and rich, even when we cannot describe our experience due to limitations of attention, memory or other cognitive processes. But the nature of visual awareness is quite sparse, as suggested by the phenomena of failures of awareness, such as change blindness and inattentional blindness. I will argue that once failures of memory or failures of comparison are ruled out as explanations for these phenomena, they present strong evidence against rich awareness. To accommodate and explain these massive failures of awareness, any theory of phenomenal consciousness must downgrade phenomenology to a degree where it is functionless or, ironically, does not reflect what we experience.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.