The status of consciousness in nature

A philosophical examination argues that phenomenal consciousness may involve an ontological gap—a fundamental difference from physical reality—without an explanatory gap, meaning science could still explain it. This challenges both the view that science cannot explain consciousness (explanatory gap) and the view that an explanatory gap implies an ontological gap (property dualism). The paper explores this fourth logical possibility, suggesting consciousness might be physically explained yet ontologically distinct.

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Abstract

The most central metaphysical question about phenomenal consciousness is that of what constitutes phenomenal consciousness, whereas the most central epistemic question about consciousness is that of whether science can eventually provide an explanation of the phenomenon. Many philosophers have argued that science doesn’t have the means to answer the question of what consciousness is (the explanatory gap) but that consciousness nonetheless is fully determined by the physical facts underlying it (no ontological gap). Others have argued that the explanatory gap in the sciences entails an ontological gap. This position is also known as ‘property dualism’. Here I examine a fourth position, according to which there an ontological gap but no explanatory gap.