CAUSAL-PATTERN THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS: A CHALLENGE AND A META-CAUSAL RESPONSE
Manuscrito December 17, 2024 DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2024.v47n1.jb via DOAJ
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA new challenge targets consciousness theories that require conscious processes to involve causation patterned in a specific way, including Integrated Information Theory, Global Workspace theories, and a type of Higher-Order Thought theory. The challenge is that the causal pattern itself is not required for the effects those processes have on the organism's other aspects, making the property of being conscious dispensable in accounting for those effects. This raises operational and evolutionary problems. The paper proposes meeting the challenge by introducing meta-causation, where causation acts on causation instances themselves, allowing instances of causation in conscious processes to be causes of effects elsewhere. The author also summarizes previous motivation for meta-causation as the basis of consciousness.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Phenomenal consciousness Meta-causation |
| Key finding | The causal pattern in conscious processes is not required for their effects on the organism, but introducing meta-causation—causation acting on causation instances—can resolve this challenge. |
Abstract
Abstract This article presents a challenge concerning the causal efficacy of causal processes, distinct from the much-discussed causal-exclusion problem. The new challenge is to consciousness theories that require conscious processes to involve causation patterned in some specific way. This broad, diverse class includes prominent theories such as the Integrated Information Theory, Global Workspace theories and a type of Higher-Order Thought theory. The challenge arises because the causal pattern is not itself required for the effects the processes have on the organism’s other aspects. Hence, the processes’ property of being conscious is dispensable in accounting for those effects. The theories are challenged to show how this does not constitute an operational problem for individual organisms or a problem as regards explaining the evolution of consciousness. The paper explains how the challenge can be met by the radical move of introducing meta-causation: causation that acts on causation instances themselves. This allows the instances of causation in conscious processes, as entities in their own right, to be causes of effects elsewhere. The paper also summarizes the author’s previously published motivation for proposing meta-causation, as the basis of consciousness itself. The present paper further supports this view.