Are Composite Subjects Possible? A Clarification of the Subject Combination Problem Facing Panpsychism

Panpsychism holds that consciousness is a fundamental feature of all physical matter, but it struggles with the subject combination problem: whether and how individual subjects of experience can combine into a larger subject. This paper clarifies the real nature of that problem by analyzing a debate between Siddharth and Miller about the phenomenal bonding solution. It argues that many proposed solutions misunderstand the threat. The author evaluates defenses of subject composition and concludes that the combination problem remains unresolved.

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Abstract

Panpsychism, the view that phenomenal consciousness is present at the fundamental physical level, faces the subject combination problem––the question of whether (and how) subjects of experience can combine. While various solutions to the problem have been proposed, these often seem to be based on a misunderstanding of the threat posed by the subject combination problem. An example is the exchange in this journal between Siddharth (2021) and Miller (2022). Siddharth argued that the phenomenal bonding solution failed to address the subject combination problem, while Miller responded that Siddharth had (among other things) misunderstood the problem that the phenomenal bonding solution was trying to solve. In this paper, I seek to clarify the real subject combination problem facing panpsychism, and on this basis, evaluate the various attempts at defending the possibility of subject composition.