Against Phenomenal Bonding

Panpsychism claims that all fundamental physical entities have phenomenal consciousness, but it faces the combination problem: how micro-experiences combine into the unified experiences of larger beings like humans. A key part of this problem is the subject-summing argument, which holds that combining distinct subjects of experience is impossible. Goff (2016) and Miller (2017) proposed a 'phenomenal bonding relation' to explain how subjects could compose. This paper examines that solution and argues it does not adequately address the subject-summing argument, leaving the combination problem unresolved.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Panpsychism, the view that phenomenal consciousness is possessed by all fundamental physical entities, faces an important challenge in the form of the combination problem: how do experiences of microphysical entities combine or give rise to the experiences of macrophysical entities such as human beings? An especially troubling aspect of the combination problem is the subject-summing argument, according to which the combination of subjects is not possible. In response to this argument, Goff (2016) and Miller (2017) have proposed the phenomenal bonding relation, using which they seek to explain the composition of subjects. In this paper, I discuss the merits of the phenomenal bonding solution and argue that it fails to respond satisfactorily to the subject-summing argument.