Knowledge by Experience. Or Why Physicalism Should not be our Default Position in Consciousness Studies

A common-sense-based argument against physicalism regarding phenomenal consciousness is presented. The author contends that the widespread presupposition that a physicalist view of consciousness must be correct is not justified. The paper elaborates on a strong prima facie case for rejecting physicalism, grounded in common sense, arguing that the nature or essence of conscious experience cannot be fully captured by physical descriptions. This challenges the assumption that consciousness is entirely physical, suggesting that ordinary intuitions provide compelling reasons to doubt materialism.

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Abstract

Current philosophical and scientific approaches to consciousness are very often characterised by a strong background presupposition: whatever the precise details of a theory of consciousness may be, a physicalist – or materialist – view of consciousness itself must be correct. I believe, however, that this conviction, pervasive though it may be, is not really justified. In particular, I think (1) that the arguments offered in favour of the materialist presupposition are weak and unconvincing, and (2) that there is a very strong prima facie case for rejecting physicalism regarding phenomenal consciousness. In a previous article of mine I have already discussed the first point; the present paper is devoted to elaborating the second, presenting a common-sense-based argument against physicalism.