The material constitution of phenomenal consciousness

A physicalist account of the mind is developed, responding to arguments that conscious experience seems to resist physical explanation. The author first answers the knowledge and conceivability arguments by suggesting introspection might misrepresent phenomenal states as having qualities they lack. An alternative Russellian monist view is then proposed, where unknown intrinsic physical properties ground known microphysical properties and also explain phenomenal consciousness. Finally, a nonreductive physicalism is defended, where the mental is materially constituted by the microphysical rather than identical to it.

Study at a glance

Abstract

In this article I set out in concise form the physicalist account of the mental I develop in Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism (Pereboom, 2011). I first set out a response to the knowledge and conceivability arguments against physicalism, one that features the open possibility that introspection represents phenomenal states as having qualitative features they actually lack. I then propose an alternative Russellian Monist answer to these arguments, according to which currently unknown absolutely intrinsic physical properties provide categorical bases for known microphysical properties and also yield an account of phenomenal consciousness. Lastly, I defend a nonreductive physicalist account of the mental, in which the fundamental relation between the mental and the microphysical is material constitution and not identity.