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Breakdowns of sensemaking: a neurophenomenological approach

Justin Aaron Moll

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences May 2, 2026 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-026-10153-3 via OpenAlex

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

When people lose their ability to make sense of the world, they experience phenomena ranging from extreme crises or epiphanies to everyday learning, frustration, or indifference. This paper integrates phenomenological philosophy (especially post-Heideggerian traditions) with neurocognitive and neurophysiological research on predictive processing and enactivism to create a unified model of such breakdowns. The resulting model describes a U-shaped distribution: extreme breakdowns challenge fundamental dimensions of sensemaking and become either crises or epiphanies, while less fundamental disruptions produce a continuum of learning, indifference, and frustration. The concept of response—how one reacts to a disruptive event—determines whether the experience enriches or problematizes sensemaking.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Sensemaking Phenomenology philosophy Neurocognitive Relation database
Key finding Breakdowns of sensemaking follow a U-shaped distribution where extreme forms become crises or epiphanies and milder forms produce learning, indifference, or frustration, with the concept of response determining whether the experience enriches or problematizes sensemaking.

Abstract

Abstract Sometimes our ability to make sense of the world breaks down. Such breakdowns of sensemaking give rise to a range of phenomena, including extreme experiences such as crisis and epiphany, as well as day-to-day forms of learning, frustration, or indifference. Various accounts in the domains of phenomenology and the neurocognitive and neurophysiological sciences capture facets of sensemaking and the phenomena that arise from its breakdown. However, the relation of these accounts and an overarching model of forms of breakdown has not been articulated. This paper offers such a neurophenomenology of breakdowns of sensemaking by emphasising various bridges between these perspectives. Concretely, it brings together phenomenological contributions in the post-Heideggerian tradition that articulate intersubjective, action-oriented and highly individualised dimensions of sensemaking, with neurocognitive and neurophysiological contributions that explicate enactivism in terms of predictive processing models and associated neural processes. The final model derived from these accounts describes breakdown phenomena in terms of a U-shaped distribution: extreme forms of breakdown that challenge fundamental dimensions of our sensemaking represent either crises or epiphanies. Breakdowns that do not immediately pertain to fundamental dimensions of our wellbeing give rise to a continuum of learning, indifference and frustration. A central role is played on this account by the notion of response, which determines whether a disruptive occurrence tends to either enrich or problematize our sensemaking practice.

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