Now is the time: operationalizing generative neurophenomenology through interpersonal methods.

Lived experience is shaped by intersubjective, social, cultural, and historical dimensions. Neurophenomenology, which integrates first-person experiential and third-person neurobehavioural perspectives, reveals mutual constraints between them. This article argues the scientific community is ready to adopt a generative neurophenomenology, clarifying three meanings of 'generative' as applied to phenomenology, passages, and models. It proposes combining methods: transitioning from individual to multiple people phenomenology, expanding neuroscience to include multimodal interpersonal synchrony, and leveraging computational tools to integrate viewpoints. It underscores that using computational approaches does not endorse computationalism. Clinical relevance is illustrated with case studies in autism and family therapy, demonstrating translational potential.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Lived experience is shaped by intersubjective, social, cultural, and historical dimensions. For the past 30 years, neurophenomenology has adopted an embodied perspective of the mind by integrating first-person experiential and third-person neurobehavioural perspectives. Neurophenomenology reveals mutual constraints between both, as they co-constitute a person's lived experience. This article emphasizes the intersubjective and social facets of lived experience as core to generative neurophenomenology, envisioned in the 1990s by Francisco Varela, and argues that the scientific community is now ready to adopt this approach. For this endeavour, we clarify three meanings of 'generative' as it applies distinctly to generative phenomenology, generative passages, and generative models. Then, we propose to combine existing methods to update neurophenomenology program: first, by transitioning from individual to multiple people phenomenology methods that include intersubjectivity experience; second, by expanding traditional neuroscience to include measures of multimodal interpersonal synchrony; and third, by leveraging multiple computational tools to integrate different viewpoints, thereby enriching our understanding of lived experience. We also underscore the potential of diverse mathematical formalisms to capture aspects of human experience, all while underscoring that using computational approaches to model neurophenomenology does not entail endorsing computationalism as a grounding hypothesis of human experience. Finally, we illustrate the clinical relevance of this paradigm through two case studies in psychiatry-(1) with interactive dyads in autism and (2) with multiple members in family therapy sessions-demonstrating its translational potential.