Now is the Time: Operationalizing Generative Neurophenomenology through Interpersonal Methods

Neurophenomenology, which combines first-person experience with third-person neurobehavioral data, is extended to address intersubjective and social dimensions of lived experience. The article clarifies three meanings of 'generative'—generative phenomenology, generative passages, and generative models—and proposes updating the approach by moving from individual to multiple-person phenomenology, including measures of multimodal interpersonal synchrony, and using computational tools to integrate viewpoints without endorsing computationalism. Clinical relevance is illustrated through case studies in autism (interactive dyads) and family therapy (multiple members), showing translational potential.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Lived experience is shaped by intersubjective, social, cultural, and historical dimensions. For the past 30 years, neurophenomenology has adopted an embodied perspective of the mind by integrating first-person experiential and third-person neurobehavioral perspectives. Indeed, the neurophenomenology pragmatic approach has embraced an embodied perspective of the mind by integrating experiential first-person and neurobehavioural third-person perspectives. Neurophenomenology reveals mutual constraints between both, as they co-constitute a person’s lived experience. This article emphasizes the intersubjective and social facets of lived experience as well as the readiness of the scientific community to use a "generative neurophenomenology" approach, envisioned in the 1990s by Francisco Varela. For this endeavour, we clarify three meanings of “generative” as it applies distinctly to generative phenomenology, generative passages, and generative models. Then, we propose to combine existing methods to update neurophenomenology program: First, by transitioning from individual to multiple people phenomenology methods that include intersubjectivity experience; second, by expanding traditional neuroscience to include measures of multimodal interpersonal synchrony; and third, by leveraging multiple computational tools to integrate different viewpoints, thereby enriching our understanding of lived experience; We also underscore the potential of diverse mathematical formalisms to capture aspects of human experience, all while underscoring that using computational approaches to model neurophenomenology does not entail endorsing computationalism as a grounding hypothesis of human experience. Finally, we illustrate the clinical relevance of this paradigm through two case studies in psychiatry—(1) with interactive dyads in autism and (2) with multiple members in family therapy sessions—demonstrating its translational potential.