Moral enhancement and cheapened achievement: Psychedelics, virtual reality and AI.

A common objection to cognitive or athletic enhancement is that using drugs or technologies to improve performance 'cheapens' the resulting achievement. This paper extends that objection to moral enhancement—using biotechnology to become a morally better person. The authors argue that if the cheapened-achievement objection holds for cognitive or athletic enhancement, it can also apply to some forms of moral enhancement, but not all. Highly speculative or determinative technologies might diminish the value of moral self-improvement. However, more practical forms—where drugs or technologies play an adjunctive or facilitative role, such as psychedelics in moral learning, 'Socratic AI,' or empathy enhancement via virtual reality—largely evade the objection, assuming those technologies work as intended. The most promising forms of moral enhancement thus avoid a leading critique of other enhancements.

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Abstract

A prominent critique of cognitive or athletic enhancement claims that certain performance-improving drugs or technologies may 'cheapen' resulting achievements. Considerably less attention has been paid to the impact of enhancement on the value of moral achievements. Would the use of moral enhancement (bio)technologies, rather than (solely) 'traditional' means of moral development like schooling and socialization, cheapen the 'achievement' of morally improving oneself? We argue that, to the extent that the 'cheapened achievement' objection succeeds in the domains of cognitive or athletic enhancement, it could plausibly also succeed in the domain of moral enhancement-but only regarding certain forms. Specifically, although the value of moral self-improvement may be diminished by some of the more speculative and impractical forms of moral enhancement proposed in the literature, this worry has less force when applied to more plausibly viable forms of moral enhancement: forms in which drugs or technologies play an adjunctive or facilitative, rather than a determinative, role in moral improvement. We illustrate this idea with three examples from recent literature: the possible use of psychedelic drugs in certain moral-learning contexts, 'Socratic Al' (a proposed Al-driven moral enhancer) and empathy enhancement through virtual reality (VR). We argue that if one assumes that these technologies work roughly as advertised (which is an open empirical question), the 'cheapened achievement' objection loses much of its bite. The takeaway lesson is that moral enhancement in its most promising and practical forms ultimately evades a leading critique of cognitive and athletic enhancement. We end by reflecting on the potential upshot of our analysis for enhancement debates more widely.