A mechanistic alternative to minimal sufficiency as the guiding principle for NCC research.

The neuroscience of consciousness has traditionally aimed to identify the minimal neural conditions sufficient for conscious experience. This paper argues for a shift to a mechanistic approach that seeks neural difference-makers—components that causally contribute to consciousness—rather than merely sufficient conditions. It clarifies how the mutual manipulability criterion can distinguish constitutive parts of a mechanism from merely causal influences. Applying this framework to debates about the prefrontal cortex, the author contends that the prefrontal cortex qualifies as part of the neural mechanisms underlying consciousness, even if it is not strictly necessary for every instance of consciousness.

Study at a glance

Abstract

A central project for the neuroscience of consciousness is to reveal the neural basis of consciousness. For the past 20-odd years, this project has been conceptualized in terms of minimal sufficiency. Recently, a number of authors have suggested that the project is better conceived in mechanistic terms as the search for difference-makers. In this paper, I (i) motivate this mechanistic alternative to minimal sufficiency, (ii) develop it further by clarifying debates about the prospects of leveraging mutual manipulability to distinguish constitutive difference-makers from those that are merely causal, and (iii) explore the implications this has for recent debates concerning the status of the prefrontal cortex. I argue that adopting a mechanistic approach to the neuroscience of consciousness suggests that the prefrontal cortex is part of the neural mechanisms underlying consciousness even if it is not strictly speaking a necessary part.