Does Vedānta Concern the Hard Problem of Consciousness? Part I: A Critical Examination of the Perennial Idealist Reading of Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta

This philosophical paper distinguishes the hard problem of consciousness (HPC), central to contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, from the hard problem of the self (HPS), which preoccupied classical Indian philosophy. It critically evaluates Miri Albahari's perennial idealism (PI), a view she associates with Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta, which proposes non-dual universal consciousness as a solution to the HPC. Focusing on Albahari's response to objections about whether such consciousness can ground subject-level phenomenal-intentional consciousness, the author argues that Śaṅkara's metaphysics of non-dual universal consciousness as the ground of all being cannot solve the HPC because it is not fit to ground that type of consciousness.

Study at a glance

Abstract

In a series of papers, Miri Albahari (2019; 2020; 2022; 2024) has articulated and defended perennial idealism (PI), a view she associates with Śakara’s Advaita Vedānta. She argues that PI offers a solution to the hard problem of consciousness (HPC). In this work, I distinguish the HPC, which occupies contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, from the hard problem of the self (HPS), which occupied classical Indian philosophy. I then critically evaluate Albahari’s use of non-dual universal consciousness to solve the HPC. I focus on her response to a set of objections to the view that non-dual universal consciousness is fit for grounding subject‐level phenomenal‐intentional consciousness – the target of the HPC. I argue that because Śakara’s metaphysics of non-dual universal consciousness as the ground of all being is not fit to ground, it cannot solve the HPC.