Representationalism about Consciousness
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.19
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractRepresentationalism holds that sensory consciousness consists in representing the world as being a certain way. Some philosophers argue that this view supports reducing consciousness to physical processes, while others contend that conscious representation resists standard reductive models, making the mind–body problem more difficult. This chapter defines representationalism, presents a key argument for it, reviews common objections, and examines both reductive and nonreductive versions of the theory.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 23 |
| Key finding | Representationalism can be formulated in both reductive and nonreductive forms, and its relationship to the mind–body problem remains contested. |
Abstract
According to representationalists, sensory consciousness is a matter of representing the world to be a certain way. Some (Armstrong, Tye, Dretske) have suggested that representationalism fits well with the idea that consciousness can be reduced to something physical. Others think that representationalism makes the mind–body problem harder because our usual models for reducing representation do not apply in the special case of conscious representation. This chapter formulates representationalism, discusses an argument for it, and considers standard objections. The chapter concludes by looking at reductive and nonreductive representationalism.