Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument?

The knowledge argument challenges physicalism—the view that the world is entirely physical—by claiming there are facts about consciousness not deducible from complete physical truths. Frank Jackson, who originally formulated the argument, later rejected it, arguing that sensory experience should be understood as representationalism (or intentionalism), where phenomenal states are merely representational states. This chapter contends that Jackson's representationalist response fails. Physicalists still face a representationalist version of the knowledge argument that retains the original's force; reformulating the challenge in representationalist terms does little to help physicalists answer it.

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Abstract

AbstractThe knowledge argument aims to refute physicalism — the view that the world is entirely physical. The argument first establishes the existence of facts (or truths or information) about consciousness that are not a priori deducible from the complete physical truth, and then infers the falsity of physicalism from this lack of deducibility. Frank Jackson gave the argument its classic formulation, but has since rejected the argument claiming that it relies on a false conception of sensory experience, which should be replaced with representationalism (also known as intentionalism) — the view that phenomenal states are just representational states. This chapter argues that Jackson's representationalist response to the knowledge argument fails. Physicalists face a representationalist version of the knowledge argument that inherits the force of the original. Reformulating the challenge in representationalist terms does little to help physicalists answer it.