Phenomenal Consciousness: A Critical Analysis of Knowledge Argument, Inverted Spectrum Argument and Conceivability Argument

Phenomenal consciousness—the subjective, first-person experience of being—cannot be fully explained by reductive physicalist theories. The paper argues for a non-reductive account, contending that reductionist approaches fail to capture the qualitative character of subjective experience. It examines three classic arguments—the inverted spectrum, the knowledge argument, and the conceivability argument—to show that phenomenal properties resist identification with physical or functional states. The debate hinges on two opposing commitments: reductive-naturalistic objectivism, which seeks to demystify consciousness, and phenomenal realism, which insists on the irreducibility of subjective experience.

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Abstract

The objective of this paper is to defend the non-reductive thesis of phenomenal consciousness. This paper will give an overview of the arguments for the non-reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness and justify why the reductionist approach is implausible in the context of explaining phenomenal subjective experience. The debate between reductionist and non-reductionist on the project of Demystifying and Mystifying phenomenal consciousness is driven by two fundamental assumptions-1) Reductive-Naturalistic Objectivism, 2) Phenomenal Realism. There are several arguments for the irreducibility of phenomenal consciousness; this paper will focus on the inverted spectrum argument, knowledge argument, and the conceivability argument.