The Problem of Evil and the Problem of Consciousness

The problem of evil—whether the existence of evil undermines belief in God—and the problem of consciousness—how conscious experience arises from physical processes—are typically treated as separate issues in philosophy. This paper argues they are actually versions of a single underlying problem, termed the “problem of ontological expectation mismatch.” Recognizing this common root provides a fresh perspective for systematically evaluating existing approaches to both problems. The thesis is then used to critically examine panpsychism, a popular recent response to the problem of consciousness.

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Abstract

The problem of evil and the problem of consciousness occupy central positions in the philosophy of religion and the philosophy of mind, respectively. On the face of it, these problems seem to be fundamentally distinct. The problem of evil is concerned with whether the existence of evil in the world undermines belief in the existence of God while the problem of consciousness concerns the nature of consciousness and how it can arise from physical processes in the brain. In this paper, however, I defend the following novel thesis: the problem of evil and the problem of consciousness are versions of the same problem, which I term the “problem of ontological expectation mismatch.” I argue that, by recognizing that they stem from the same root, we can gain a fresh perspective for evaluating existing approaches to both problems in a systematic manner. I conclude my discussion by utilizing this thesis to critically examine panpsychism, a response to the problem of consciousness that has recently gained significant popularity.