The Epistemic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.22
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe hard problem of consciousness asks why and how physical processes give rise to subjective experience. The epistemic view holds that we are currently ignorant of something important and relevant to solving this problem. This chapter outlines one version of that view, then considers two objections: first, that we are not ignorant of any feature relevant to the hard problem; second, that even if the epistemic approach is true, it does not answer or contribute to the problem. The chapter concludes by reflecting on why the epistemic approach, despite its appeal, remains a minority position in contemporary philosophy of mind.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | The epistemic view of the hard problem of consciousness faces two main objections—that we are not ignorant of relevant features and that it does not contribute to solving the problem—and remains a minority view in philosophy of mind. |
Abstract
According to the epistemic view of the hard problem of consciousness, we are ignorant at least for the time being of something important and relevant when it comes to the hard problem, and this fact has a significant implication for its solution. This chapter outlines one version of the view before considering two objections. The first is that, while we may be ignorant of various features of the world, we are not ignorant of any feature that is relevant to the hard problem. The second is that, even if the epistemic approach is true, properly understood it is not an answer to the hard problem; indeed, it is no contribution to that problem at all. The chapter concludes with some brief reflections on why the epistemic approach, despite its attractiveness, remains a minority view in contemporary philosophy of mind.