Perceptual integration without conscious access.
Johannes J Fahrenfort, Jonathan Van Leeuwen, Christian N L Olivers, Hinze Hogendoorn
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America April 4, 2017 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1617268114 via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe visual system can integrate fragmented input into organized surfaces and objects, a process called perceptual integration. Whether this requires conscious access was tested using the attentional blink, which impairs conscious perception. Behaviorally, the attentional blink reduced accurate conscious decisions about integrated surface structure. Yet, multivariate EEG decoding showed the brain still represented integrated percepts even when conscious access was blocked. In contrast, masking impaired both conscious decisions and neural decoding of integration, while leaving feedforward signals intact. These findings indicate that perceptual integration can occur without access to consciousness, dissociating the two processes.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Experimental study Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Interventions | attentional blink masking |
| Keywords | Access consciousness Attentional blink Masking Perceptual integration Phenomenal consciousness |
| Citations | 102 |
| Key finding | Perceptual integration can be decoded from EEG signals even when conscious access is impaired by the attentional blink, showing a dissociation between access consciousness and perceptual integration. |
Abstract
The visual system has the remarkable ability to integrate fragmentary visual input into a perceptually organized collection of surfaces and objects, a process we refer to as perceptual integration. Despite a long tradition of perception research, it is not known whether access to consciousness is required to complete perceptual integration. To investigate this question, we manipulated access to consciousness using the attentional blink. We show that, behaviorally, the attentional blink impairs conscious decisions about the presence of integrated surface structure from fragmented input. However, despite conscious access being impaired, the ability to decode the presence of integrated percepts remains intact, as shown through multivariate classification analyses of electroencephalogram (EEG) data. In contrast, when disrupting perception through masking, decisions about integrated percepts and decoding of integrated percepts are impaired in tandem, while leaving feedforward representations intact. Together, these data show that access consciousness and perceptual integration can be dissociated.