Access is mainly a second-order process: SDT models whether phenomenally (first-order) conscious states are accessed by reflectively (second-order) conscious processes.
Michael Snodgrass, Natasha Kalaida, E Samuel Winer
Consciousness and cognition June 1, 2009 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2009.01.003 via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractConscious access can be divided into two types: first-order access, where content becomes phenomenally conscious, and second-order access, where that conscious content is selected for higher-order reflective processing. When second-order access is understood as optional and flexible, there are strong reasons to believe that stimuli can be phenomenally conscious without being accessed in this second-order way. The partial access argument against this view fails because exclusion failure is due to lack of second-order access, not insufficient conscious information. The enable account better fits qualitative differences and subjective report and is simpler than the alternative. Second-order access arguably reflects the core meaning of access generally.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 28 |
| Key finding | Exclusion failure can isolate phenomenally conscious stimuli that lack second-order access, and the enable account is simpler and more consistent with evidence than the endow account. |
Abstract
Access can either be first-order or second-order. First order access concerns whether contents achieve representation in phenomenal consciousness at all; second-order access concerns whether phenomenally conscious contents are selected for metacognitive, higher order processing by reflective consciousness. When the optional and flexible nature of second-order access is kept in mind, there remain strong reasons to believe that exclusion failure can indeed isolate phenomenally conscious stimuli that are not so accessed. Irvine's [Irvine, E. (2009). Signal detection theory, the exclusion failure paradigm and weak consciousness-Evidence for the access/phenomenal distinction? Consciousness and Cognition.] partial access argument fails because exclusion failure is indeed due to lack of second-order access, not insufficient phenomenally conscious information. Further, the enable account conforms with both qualitative differences and subjective report, and is simpler than the endow account. Finally, although first-order access may be a distinct and important process, second-order access arguably reflects the core meaning of access generally.