An analogical abductive argument to assess fetal consciousness

Analogical abduction combines analogical reasoning with inference to the best explanation to justify claims about consciousness in others. This paper applies that method to fetuses at the end of the second trimester, using a three-step recipe. Given the best minimal model of adult human consciousness and current evidence on fetal brain architecture, the argument supports the conclusion that these fetuses are probably not conscious. The work also shows both the strengths and limits of analogical abduction as a theory-light tool for detecting consciousness across different populations.

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Abstract

Analogical abduction is a form of reasoning that combines analogical analysis with inference to the best explanation to address the epistemological problem of other consciousnesses—that is, what justifies our ascriptions of consciousness to other entities? In this paper, I apply analogical abduction to the case of fetal consciousness, focusing on fetuses at the end of the second trimester. I present a three-step recipe for constructing analogical abductive arguments and I apply it to this specific case. I argue that, given the best minimal model of adult human consciousness and the available evidence about fetal brain architecture, analogical abduction supports the conclusion that fetuses at the end of the second trimester are probably not conscious. Beyond this, the paper illustrates both the promise and the limitations of analogical abduction as a theory-light tool for discovering consciousness across diverse populations.