Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2024
Niccolò Negro
19 citations
The neuroscience of consciousness is accelerating empirically through adversarial collaborations that test rival theories. This paper argues that consciousness science should be paired with confirmation theory, the philosophical study of evidence and hypotheses, to understand how experiments challenge or validate theories. Using Lakatos's philosophy of science, the author proposes a model of theory-appraisal built on three criteria: the distinction between prediction and accommodation, the structural relevance of predictions, and the boldness of predictions. This Lakatosian model offers both normative and descriptive advantages, advancing the debate by considering theories' diachronic development, logical structure, and relationship with background knowledge.
Frontiers in psychology
January 1, 2023
Marius Usher, Niccolò Negro, Hilla Jacobson et al.
7 citations
The Unfolding Argument (UA) against causal structure theories of consciousness relies on unwarranted assumptions that express a behaviorist methodology, despite its proponents' claims. The same reasoning can be applied to functionalist approaches, proving too much and deeming a wide range of non-causal structure theories unscientific. The authors argue that the UA's philosophical assumptions are overly restrictive and fit poorly with common practice in cognitive neuroscience. They propose a more inclusive methodology for consciousness science that incorporates neural, behavioral, and phenomenological evidence from the first-person perspective. Theories of consciousness should be tested and evaluated on humans, not on systems considerably different from us, thus restricting the range of systems rather than the methodology.
Philosophy of Science
August 27, 2025
Niccolò Negro, Liad Mudrik
4 citations
Attributing consciousness to nonstandard systems such as animals, neural organoids, and artificial intelligence requires a robust justificatory framework. This article argues that analogical abduction—a reasoning method that combines analogical and abductive elements—is the strongest approach for extrapolating consciousness from humans to these systems. The argument from analogy and inference to the best explanation, taken individually, fail to meet the criteria for successful extrapolations. Analogical abduction offers a promising alternative, though limitations in current consciousness science remain. The article clarifies the argumentative structure behind such attributions, which is important for evaluating their validity.
Synthese
June 19, 2025
Niccolò Negro
1 citation
Understanding consciousness requires describing its relational and structural properties, a view called phenomenal structuralism. This paper distinguishes three types: methodological, epistemological, and metaphysical structuralism. It critically evaluates metaphysical structuralism, which claims that the phenomenal character of an experience is fully determined by its relational properties, and presents three arguments demonstrating its inadequacy. However, this critique does not affect the fruitfulness of methodological and epistemological structuralism. The analysis clarifies that these latter forms can contribute to consciousness science without heavy and counterintuitive metaphysical commitments.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
July 6, 2026
Niccolò Negro
Analogical abduction combines analogical reasoning with inference to the best explanation to justify claims about consciousness in others. This paper applies that method to fetuses at the end of the second trimester, using a three-step recipe. Given the best minimal model of adult human consciousness and current evidence on fetal brain architecture, the argument supports the conclusion that these fetuses are probably not conscious. The work also shows both the strengths and limits of analogical abduction as a theory-light tool for detecting consciousness across different populations.