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Mind Back to Life

Juan Manuel Martínez García

Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia April 18, 2026 DOI: 10.18270/rcfc.4705 via DOAJ

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

The computationalist paradigm in cognitive science, known as cognitivism, has dominated the field and obscured alternative approaches such as those from the Cognition 4E school. This work analyzes cognitivism's conceptual assumptions and criticizes two central tenets: representationalism and functionalism. It then offers a philosophical justification for enactivism, outlining its theoretical foundations and methodological implications as a promising direction within cognitive sciences.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Cognitive sciences Cognitivism Representationalism Functionalism Enactivism
Key finding Enactivism is presented as a philosophically justified alternative to cognitivism after criticizing representationalism and functionalism.

Abstract

The computationalist paradigm in cognitive science, currently known as cognitivism, has exerted a philosophical and empirical dominance that has hindered the visibility and contemplation of contemporary alternative paradigms such as those proposed by the Cognition 4E school. To encourage the exploration of these new theoretical currents, this work aims to analyze the conceptual assumptions of cognitivism and to criticize two of its central tenets (representationalism and functionalism). In this way we hope to obtain a philosophical justification of enactivism, its theoretical foundations and methodological implications as a promising path within the cognitive sciences.

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