The exceptionality of enactivism within 4E cognition

Only a specific strain of enactive cognition—autopoietic or autonomist enactivism—genuinely challenges all core tenets of mainstream cognitive science, which are grounded in computationalism, representationalism, functionalism, internalism, and realism. Most other embodied, embedded, or extended cognition theories can be assimilated into the traditional cognitivist framework when suitably qualified. Autopoietic enactivism, rooted in second-order cybernetics and autopoietic theory, demands a deeper reconceptualization of cognition as emergent from dynamic, embodied interaction rather than internal symbol manipulation, resisting realist commitments and leaning toward radical constructivism. Thus, the enactive approach remains the only strand within 4E cognition where a full rejection of foundational assumptions is possible.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Abstract This article critically examines the theoretical landscape of 4E cognition—embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive cognition—to assess whether it constitutes a true departure from the traditional framework in the cognitive sciences grounded in computationalism, representationalism, functionalism, internalism, and realism. While many proponents of 4E cognition claim to defend such a radical shift, I argue that only a specific strain of enactive cognition—autopoietic or autonomist enactivism—genuinely challenges all core tenets of mainstream cognitive science. Drawing on the causation-constitution dichotomy and the literature on weak versus strong variants of embodied and extended cognition, I show that most E-theories can be assimilated into the cognitivist framework when suitably qualified. By contrast, autopoietic enactivism, with its roots in second-order cybernetics and autopoietic theory, demands a deeper reconceptualization of cognition as emergent from dynamic, embodied interaction rather than internal symbol manipulation. It resists realist commitments to cognitive posits and leans toward radical constructivism, presenting a comprehensive reconceptualization of the field rather than mere theoretical elaboration. Thus, I conclude that the enactive approach remains the only strand within 4E cognition where a full rejection of the foundational assumptions of traditional cognitive science is possible.