Naïve Realism and Minimal Self

Phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness, particularly the concept of a minimal self, can improve analytic philosophy of perception by clarifying the felt character of perceptual experience. Naïve realism, a contemporary theory holding that perception is a direct relation to mind-independent objects, is compatible with and can be enriched by experiential minimalism, a pre-reflective model of self-consciousness from the phenomenological tradition. The paper argues that naïve realism's commitments to relationalism and transparency align with the minimal self view, suggesting these two approaches should be combined.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This paper defends the idea that phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness can enrich the current analytic philosophy of perception, by showing how phenomenological discussions of minimal self-consciousness can enhance our understanding of the phenomenology of conscious perceptual experiences. As a case study, I investigate the nature of the relationship between naïve realism, a contemporary Anglophone theory of perception, and experiential minimalism (or, the ‘minimal self’ view), a pre-reflective model of self-consciousness originated in the Phenomenological tradition. I argue that naïve realism is not only compatible with, but can be supplemented with experiential minimalism in a novel way. The suggestion is that there are reasons to combine naïve realism and experiential minimalism. My focus here will be on drawing a connection between the notion of minimal self and two core theoretical commitments of naïve realism, relationalism and transparency.