Affectivity and the distinction between minimal and narrative self

A distinction is often drawn between a 'minimal' self, present in immediate experience, and a 'narrative' self, built from life stories. Some argue these are fundamentally distinct, with the minimal self enabling the narrative self but not being shaped by it. This paper challenges that view by examining affective experiences. Drawing on classical and contemporary phenomenology, it argues that certain emotions and moods are complex phenomena where minimal and narrative selfhood are deeply entwined. Because affective states are evaluative, they convey a pre-reflective experience of aspects of the narrative self. This suggests that minimal and narrative selfhood are phenomenologically inextricable, not separate dimensions.

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Abstract

In the contemporary phenomenological literature it has been argued that it is possible to distinguish between two forms of selfhood: the “minimal” and “narrative” self. This paper discusses a claim which is central to this account, namely that the minimal and narrative self complement each other but are fundamentally distinct dimensions. In particular, I challenge the idea that while the presence of a minimal self is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a narrative self, the dynamics which characterise narrative selfhood do not have a structuring effect on minimal self-experience. I do so by drawing on both classical and contemporary phenomenological literature to show that at least certain forms of affective experience are complex phenomena in which minimal and narrative forms of selfhood are deeply entwined. More specifically, I claim that, due to their evaluative character, intentional and non-intentional affective states convey a pre-reflective experience of constitutive aspects of the narrative self. This enables me to argue that minimal and narrative selfhood are phenomenologically inextricable.