A Not-So-Minimal Self?

The minimal self, often considered the core and unchanging sense of self, is reinterpreted as having two levels: a formal, immutable level and a more robust level that can change. Drawing on phenomenological psychiatry, the paper critiques the idea that the minimal self is entirely unchangeable. It examines schizophrenia and borderline personality disorder to show that while the most minimal aspect remains stable across psychopathologies, the less minimal aspect is vulnerable to alteration.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This paper reinterprets the notion of the minimal self, usually iden­tified with the core and experiential self, within phenomenological psychiatry. It criticises the thesis asserting the immutability of the minimal self, positing that this dimension comprises two distinct levels: a more formal, immutable level and a more robust level susceptible to change. In the first section, I show how contemporary phenomenologists identify the minimal self as the experi­ential and core self. In the second, I question the claim of the minimal self ’s invariability by exploring phenomenological insights into schizophrenia and critiques related to borderline personality disorder. Finally, I advance a nuanced distinction within the core self, arguing that while the more minimal aspect remains stable across psychopathological conditions, the less minimal aspect is vulnerable to alteration.