Skip to content

Studia Phaenomenologica

ISSN 1582-5647

2 papers in the library · publishing 2026

Papers

A Not-So-Minimal Self?

Studia Phaenomenologica January 1, 2026 Agustina María Lombardi

The minimal self, often considered the core and unchanging sense of self, is reinterpreted as having two levels: a formal, immutable level and a more robust level that can change. Drawing on phenomenological psychiatry, the paper critiques the idea that the minimal self is entirely unchangeable. It examines schizophrenia and borderline personality disorder to show that while the most minimal aspect remains stable across psychopathologies, the less minimal aspect is vulnerable to alteration.

Nadia’s Case Revisited

Studia Phaenomenologica January 1, 2026 Mauro Senatore, Romanian Society For Phenomenology

In The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir argues that a woman's consent to becoming a being other than an authentic phenomenological subject is a moral fault. This article examines how Beauvoir addresses altered existential modes arising from patriarchal oppression, which can develop into painful psychotic conditions. Focusing on the case of Nadia, originally described by Pierre Janet and later analyzed by Ludwig Binswanger alongside the case of Ellen West, Beauvoir develops an extended phenomenology of psychosis. She integrates the patient's lived experience with political and social factors, thereby challenging Binswanger's diagnosis of Nadia and Ellen as untreatable schizophrenics.