The "minimal self" in psychopathology: re-examining the self-disorders in the schizophrenia spectrum

The concept of a minimal, basic, or core self is debated across philosophy, cognitive science, and developmental psychology, but its specific experiential features remain unclear. Examining schizophrenic experience can clarify aspects of this minimal self, including perspective, first-person perspective, the sense of 'mineness' of experience, transparency, embodiment, and the distinction between agency and ownership. Two clinical vignettes of patients diagnosed with schizophrenia are presented: one in early illness stages and another with chronic schizophrenia marked by persistent hallucinations. Their analysis explores the experiential dimensions of the minimal self.

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Abstract

The notion of minimal, basic, pre-reflective or core self is currently debated in the philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences and developmental psychology. However, it is not clear which experiential features such a self is believed to possess. Studying the schizophrenic experience may help exploring the following aspects of the minimal self: the notion of perspective and first person perspective, the 'mineness' of the phenomenal field, the questions of transparency, embodiment of point of view, and the issues of agency and ownership, considered as different and less fundamental than the feeling of mineness. Two clinical vignettes of patients with the diagnosis of schizophrenia will be presented: the first one, illustrating early illness stages, and the second case, of chronic schizophrenia, symptomatically marked by persistent hallucinations. Through their analysis, we will discuss the experiential dimensions of minimal self