How Things Take Up Space: A Grounded Theory of Presence and Lived Space

Presence—both as objecthood and immersion—is not captured by any single sense but emerges from all available sensory knowledge as a disembodied sense of solidity. Based on 117 phenomenological interviews with 14 participants sampled across positive (e.g., sexual intimacy) and negative (e.g., psychopathology) circumstances, a grounded theory analysis indicates that presence is a transmodal phenomenon, relatable to how aspects of experience translate between sensory modalities. Its relation to lived space helps explain delusion formation as rooted in sensory alterations rather than belief changes. That presence in lived space need not match objective reality informs debates on whether presence is an amodal aspect of consciousness.

Study at a glance

Abstract

In cognitive science, it is unclear what precisely presence (both in the sense of objecthood and immersion) refers to in lived experience. The present study addresses the research question of what the relationship between presence is and lived space. A hundred and seventeen phenomenological interviews were conducted with 14 participants. We sampled their experience in a transdiagnostic manner. That is, we observed how the experience of presence changes both in circumstances appraised as positive (e.g., sexual intimacy) and negative (e.g., psychopathology). Our grounded theory suggests that presence is a phenomenon that is comprised of all available sensory knowledge, however, it itself is not present in any one sensory modality. Presence takes the form of a disembodied sense of solidity. Our findings can be related to the notion of transmodality in contemporary qualitative phenomenology (i.e., the idea that there are some aspects of experience that can be readily translated from one sensory modality to another. Further, how presence (in its capacity as immersion) is related to lived space can shed further light on the formation of delusions, suggesting that it is based on sensory alterations rather than changes in belief. Finally, the observation that presence as it appears in lived space need not perfectly correspond to the objective situation, can elucidate extant discussion on whether presence is an amodal aspect of consciousness.