Presence, objecthood, and the phenomenology of predictive perception

The author argues that perceptual presence—the sense that something is really there—can be explained by predictive models that link perception with action, specifically through the framework of predictive processing of sensorimotor contingencies. The paper re-emphasizes the core commitment to predictive model-based perception, reconsiders how presence relates to objecthood, and refines the target by distinguishing perceptual presence from the phenomenology of absence-of-presence, or phenomenal unreality. This conceptual work requires speculative, blue-sky thinking to advance the theory.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Can perceptual presence be explained by counterfactually-rich predictive models linking perception and action? Considering an unusually rich range of responses to this idea has led me to (1) re-emphasize the core conceptual commitment of "predictive processing of sensorimotor contingencies" (PPSMC) to predictive model-based perception, (2) reconsider the relationship between presence and objecthood, and (3) refine the phenomenological target by differentiating between perceptual presence and the phenomenology of absence-of-presence, or "phenomenal unreality." It turns out that this requires blue-sky thinking.