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Distinguishing volumetric content from perceptual presence within a predictive processing framework.

Sam Wilkinson

Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences January 1, 2020 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-019-09632-7 via PubMed

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Perceptual presence—the sense that an object is fully present even when only partly seen—is distinct from volumetric content, the awareness of an object's three-dimensional shape. This distinction is explained through predictive processing, which separates agent-active expectations (driven by the perceiver's actions) from object-active expectations (driven by the object's properties). Agent-active expectations generate perceptual presence, while object-active expectations generate volumetric content. Evidence from virtual reality technologies, which create presence through user-controlled exploration, supports this view. The argument clarifies the relationship between sensorimotor enactivism and predictive processing, showing how each contributes to different aspects of perception.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Perceptual presence Predictive processing Sensorimotor contingencies
Citations 9
Key finding Perceptual presence arises from agent-active expectations in predictive processing, distinct from volumetric content which arises from object-active expectations.

Abstract

I argue for an overlooked distinction between perceptual presence and volumetric content, and flesh it out in terms of predictive processing. Within the predictive processing framework we can distinguish between agent-active and object-active expectations. The former expectations account for perceptual presence, while the latter account for volumetric content. I then support this position with reference to how experiences of presence are created by virtual reality technologies, and end by reflecting on what this means for the relationship between sensorimotor enactivism and predictive processing.

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